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Abstract 
Governments world-wide increasingly rely on gambling revenues, increasing the importance of 
understanding who gambles and why. previous literature used Tobit and Heckman models to 
statistically analyze participation in gambling. These models make strong assumptions about the 
nature of gambling participation. We examine the double hurdle model as an alternative to other 
statistical approaches to modeling gambling participation and spending.  Our results, based on 
data from a 2002 survey of gambling prevalence in Alberta, clearly prefer the double hurdle 
mode, which yields different results than the commonly used Tobit model.  
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Legal gambling is increasingly available throughout the world and also represents a 
growing source of government revenue. All levels of government around the world are 
increasingly introducing and relying on legalized gambling to generate additional revenues to 
augment general funds and to fund specific activities such as education, infrastructure and youth 
sport programs.  For example, the state of Delaware recently introduced an NFL parlay style 
betting product to curb recent budget deficits brought on by the global economic recession.  
Understanding why consumers participate in various types of gambling and the determinants of 
consumer expenditure on gambling has important public policy implications and can also 
increase understanding of consumer behaviour in this setting. 
Many previous studies have analyzed gambling participation and the frequency of 
participation using survey data.  The key feature of survey data on consumer participation in 
gambling is the presence of a large number of “zeros” – observations where the respondent 
reports not gambling during the sample period – in most data sets.  The presence of a large 
number of zeros leads to statistical problems that must be corrected for in any empirical analysis.  
The two most commonly used statistical techniques to correct for zeros are the Tobit model and 
the Heckman sample selection model (sometimes called the “heckit” model). In the literature on 
lottery participation and spending, Livernois (1989), Kitchen and Powells (1991), Stranahan and 
Borg (1998), Sawkins and Dickie (2002), and Worthington, et al. (2007) use Tobit models.  Both 
Scott and Garen (1994) and Farrell and Walker (1999) use both Tobit and Heckman sample 
selectivity models in their analysis of lottery participation.   
Zeros exist in many other settings investigated using survey data, including the purchase 
of durable goods like automobiles and television sets and the purchase of cigarettes and alcohol. 
Generally, zeros are present in survey data for three different reasons.  First, the respondent did 
not purchase the good, or undertake the activity, in question during the sample time period in the 
survey because the good is purchased infrequently.  This scenario typically applies to consumer 
durable goods like cars and television sets.  Second, the respondent would never purchase the 
good in question under any circumstance or at any price.  For gambling research this scenario is 
important as many people abstain from gambling due to religious or ethical reasons.  Third, the 
respondent would be interested in purchasing the good or participating in the activity in question, 
but the cost of purchase or participation is currently too high to elicit purchase or participation 
given the respondents preferences and level of income.  This scenario is also common in 
gambling as a person may have to travel a long distance to visit a casino because none are 
located close to the person’s residence. In economics, this scenario is called a “corner solution” 
because consuming zero units of this good is a utility maximizing decision represented by a point 
on one of the axes, hence at the “corner” of the graph, in the familiar graphical solution to the 
indifference curve/budget constraint model of consumer utility maximization from 
microeconomics. The second scenario, non-participation because of religious or ethical concerns, 
can be thought of as a special case of the third scenario, a corner solution, if the religious taboo 
or moral repugnance associated with purchase of the good or participation in the activity can be 
interpreted as an extremely high “cost” of purchase or participation. 
Recent research suggests that the cause of zeros observed in survey data has important 
statistical consequences.  Jones (2000) points out that the Heckman selectivity model applies to 
non-observed responses described in the first scenario described above, while Tobit and other 
two part models apply to the second and third scenarios.        3
In this paper we examine gambling participation and frequency of participation using a 
number of alternative two-part models, including the commonly used Tobit model and an 
important alternative, the double hurdle model.  The key distinction is that the Tobit model 
assumes that the factors explaining participation and frequency of gambling have the same effect 
on these two decisions while the double hurdle model allows for these effects to differ.  The 
Tobit model is nested in the double hurdle model, permitting direct statistical tests to determine 
which best fits the data.  We use data from a 2002 gambling participation survey from the 
province of Alberta to examine the ability of these two alternative statistical models to explain 
consumer participation in lotto and spending on lotto tickets.  Our results indicate that the double 
hurdle model fits the sample data better than the Tobit model, and that the source of the 
difference relates to the implicit assumption made by the Tobit model about the determinants of 
participation in gambling. 
 
Modeling Zeros in Gambling Survey Data  
  When statistically modeling gambling behaviour, two important and distinct issues must 
be addressed: how to model consumers’ decision to participate in gambling and how to model 
consumers’ decision about how often to gamble, or how much to spend on gambling, conditional 
on the participation decision.  The participation decision is typically addressed by a simple 
“Yes”/“No” question in gambling surveys.    If a consumer chooses to participate in some form 
of gambling (answering “Yes” to the participation question), a second question is asked, eliciting 
some measure of the respondent’s intensity of participation, either frequency of participation in 
that type of gambling or total spending on that type of gambling.  As a result, gambling survey 
data typically contain variables describing both these decisions.  
  Two statistical models have been used to analyze consumer participation in gambling and 
intensity of participation: the Tobit and Heckman models.
1  In general, economic decisions about 
gambling can be motivated by a latent variable model linking unobserved utility derived from 
gambling to observed behavior.  Formally, an individual’s decision to participate in gambling 
can be represented by an indicator function 
  I * i = α’Zi  + νi         ( 1 )   
where I*i is an unobservable indicator variable that determines whether or not individual i 
participated in gambling (I*i =1) or not (I*i =0).  α is a vector of unobserved parameters to be 
estimated, Zi is a vector of observed independent covariates that explain individual i ‘s decision 
to participate in gambling, and νi is an unobserved random variable capturing all factors other 
than Zi that influence the decision to participate in gambling.  This function describes the process 
that generates observed gambling behavior in the sample.  Equation (1) is often called the “first 
hurdle,” because it is the first step in the two-step process that generates observed gambling in 
survey data.  Formally, Equation (1) implies that individual i will participate in gambling if νi > - 
α’Zi, and the probability of observing individual i participating in gambling is P(νi > - α’Zi). 
  An individual’s decision about intensity of gambling can be represented by a function 
  g * i = β’Xi + εi         (2)  
where g*i is a latent variable reflecting how frequently an individual gambles, or how much is 
spent on gambling – a measure of latent demand for gambling— where  β is a vector of 
unobserved parameters to be estimated, Xi is a vector of independent covariates that explain 
individual i ‘s decision about intensity of gambling, and εi is an unobserved random variable   4
capturing all factors other than Xi that influence the decision about intensity of gambling.  This 
function describes the process that generates observed intensity of demand for gambling, for 
example how frequently each individual in a sample reports gambling or how much individuals 
report spending on gambling.  Equation (2) is often called the “second hurdle” in the two-step 
process. 
  One commonly used estimator in the literature is the Tobit estimator.  The Tobit 
estimator applies to a special case of the two-step process described by Equations (1) and (2): the 
case where the first hurdle is irrelevant, so P(νi > - α’Zi)= 1, and all observed gambling activity 
in the data can be attributed to gi = max(g*i,0).  Zero expenditure on gambling (gi =0) means that 
no spending on gambling is made, but the Tobit estimator cannot determine why consumers did 
not spend any money on gambling in the sample.  If εi is a normally distributed random variable 
with zero mean and constant variance, then the likelihood function for the Tobit estimator for 
this set up is  
 L T = Π1P(εi >- β’Xi) f(gi|εi >- β’Xi) Π0(1-P(εi >- β’Xi))    (3) 
where Π0 is the product operator for observations where gi=0, Π1 is the product operator for 
observations where gi =1, and f(·) is the pdf for a normally distributed random variable.  This 
function can be evaluated numerically to obtain estimates of the parameters β.  The limitation of 
Tobit comes from the assumption that the participation decision is irrelevant.  It forces the 
participation decision to be identical to the intensity decision.  Under Tobit, all zeros represent 
“corner solutions”, and all observed non-gamblers do not gamble because the price of gambling 
is too high given consumers’ preferences and income.   
  One alternative to the Tobit model is the double hurdle model.  This model has been used 
to examine the determinants of participation and intensity of cigarette smoking (Jones, 1989; 
Garcia & Labeaga, 1996), physical activity and exercise (Humphreys & Ruseski, 2007) and to 
examine the relationship between participating in the labour force and the number of hours 
worked (Blundell, Ham, & Meghir, 2007).  Abdel-Ghany and Sharpe (2001) use a double hurdle 
model to investigate consumer participation and expenditure on lotteries in Canada. 
  The double hurdle model simply relaxes the assumption that the participation decision is 
irrelevant.  It includes the possibility that P(νi > - α’Zi)<= 1.  If both εi and νi are normally 
distributed and independent random variable with zero mean and constant variance, the 
likelihood function for the double hurdle model is 
 L DH = Π1P(νi>- α’Zi)P(εi >- β’Xi)f(gi|εi >- β’Xi) ⋅ Π0(1- P(νi>- α’Zi) P(εi >- β’Xi)). (4) 
The double hurdle model allows for the observable and unobservable factors that affect 
participation (νi, α’Zi) to differ from the factors that affect intensity of gambling (εi, β’Xi).  Since 
Zi can contain variables not in Xi, the double hurdle model also allows for some factors to affect 
only participation in gambling, and not intensity.  Note that the difference between the double 
hurdle model and the Tobit model is the inclusion of Π1P(νi>- α’Zi) Π0(1- P(νi>- α’Zi) in the 
double hurdle model.  This expression is a probit model for the participation decision. By 
including the participation decision, the double hurdle model allows for observed non-gamblers 
in a sample to include both those that abstain from gambling and corner solutions.  The double 
hurdle model is more general than the Tobit model. Because the Tobit model is nested in the 
double hurdle model, the restrictions placed on the double hurdle model can be tested, using a 
likelihood ratio test. 
Garen and Scott (1993) and Farrell and Walker (1999) examine the relationship between 
observable characteristics of consumers of lotteries and expenditure on lotteries using a   5
Heckman selectivity model.  Jones (1989) points out that the Heckman selectivity model may not 
be appropriate for examining certain consumer behavior like gambling because of “first hurdle 
dominance,” a condition in which the participation decision receives greater importance than the 
intensity decision.   Additionally, under first hurdle dominance, the decision not to participate 
due to cost, is explicitly ruled out.  To see this, note that first hurdle dominance can be expressed 
statistically as P(g*i<0| I*i=1)=0; in other words, conditional on participation in gambling, the 
probability of observing an individual with negative latent demand for gambling is zero.  First 
hurdle dominance rules out corner solutions and abstentions because all zeros are attributed to 
I*i=0.  For this reason, we do not use the Heckman selectivity model. 
  Both the Tobit and double hurdle model account for the presence of zeros in gambling 
survey data.  However, each model explains observed zeros in the data differently.  In the Tobit 
model, all zeros observed in the data are attributed to corner solutions; every respondent in the 
survey would participate in gambling if the total effective price was low enough.  Also, under the 
Tobit model the participation decision is irrelevant and only the intensity decision matters for 
participation in gambling.  In the double hurdle model zeros observed in the data can be either 
corner solutions or abstentions; some respondents in the survey would not participate in 
gambling.  Additionally, the double hurdle model treats the participation decision and the 
intensity decision separately.   
In summary, previous research examining participation and frequency of gambling 
primarily used either a Tobit or Heckman selectivity model.  These models each have limitations 
in terms of how zeros in the data are generated and interpreted.  The double hurdle model relaxes 
the restrictions placed on zeros by the Tobit and Heckman selectivity models and emphasizes the 
two separate decisions consumers make when gambling. Since the Tobit model is nested in the 
double hurdle model, one can formally test which model better fits any data set. We compare 
these two approaches using data from a survey of gambling behavior carried out in the province 
of Alberta, Canada, in 2002. 
  
Data 
We analyze the data from a 2002 survey of gambling participation among residents in 
Alberta, Canada.  The survey asked questions about 29 different gambling activities.  Here, we 
focus on purchase of 6/49 Lotto tickets, a popular low odds-high payoff lottery game widely 
available throughout the province.  Alberta offers a wide variety of gambling options throughout 
the province as evidenced from the 2002-2003 annual report of the Alberta Gaming and Liquor 
Commission, the provincial gambling regulatory agency in Alberta.  Based on this report, 
Alberta had 2,111 establishments that sold lottery tickets in 2002.  $200 million in revenue 
generated from gambling in the province funded many programs including amateur sports, 
community recreation, arts, and medical research.   
The 2002 survey asked participants various questions regarding gambling participation, 
attitude towards gambling, and questions about other demographic and economic characteristics.  
Of particular interest for this paper are the questions regarding the purchase of Lotto tickets and 
other questions related to gambling behaviour. The survey had 1,804 participants. Table 1 
presents the summary statistics on the characteristics of the survey respondents.   
     <INSERT  TABLE  1>   6
57% of the sample reported purchasing Lotto tickets in the past 12 months and the average 
monthly spending on Lotto tickets was $8.28. The average age was 43.31 years with a median 
age of 42 years, which suggests a close symmetry of the data. The sample was exactly 50 percent 
male and 50 percent female.  Average income was $49,280, and respondent had, on average, just 
over 14 years of formal education. 63% were married.  The survey asked a question about 
whether or not the respondent agreed with the statement: “While gambling, you could win more 
if you used a certain system or strategy.”  We interpret this to identify individuals who believe 
that gamblers can be systematically successful.  22% of the sample either agreed or strongly 
agreed with this question, which we will exploit in the empirical analysis that follows. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
We use the Tobit and double hurdle models described above to examine participation in Lotto 
and spending on Lotto tickets.  The province has over 2,000 retail outlets where Lotto tickets can 
be purchased and drawings are twice a week.  This wide availability and frequent draw dates 
should guarantee that none of the zeros observed in the data are attributable to infrequency of 
purchase of Lotto tickets; these zeros should be due to either corner solutions or abstentions.  We 
estimated a Tobit model, Equation (3), and a double hurdle model with independent error terms, 
Equation (4) by maximum likelihood.  The explanatory variables included in these models have 
been used extensively in previous research on consumer participation in lottery and spending on 
lottery tickets.  The explanatory variables include the respondent’s age, income, education in 
years, gender and marital status.  The Tobit model has only one dependent variable, average 
monthly spending on Lotto tickets.  The double hurdle model has two dependent variables: an 
indicator variable for participation in Lotto and average monthly spending.  Both models 
contained a constant term that is not reported.  Table 2 contains parameter estimates, t-statistics, 
and other regression diagnostics obtained using the Tobit and double hurdle models. 
    <INSERT  TABLE  2> 
  The parameter estimates on age and years of education underscore the differences 
between these two alternative approaches to modeling participation and spending on lotto.  The 
results from the Tobit model in the two columns on the right of Table 2 indicate that spending on 
lotto tickets by Albertans rises with age and falls with years of formal education.  The results 
from the double hurdle model paint a different picture.  From the participation equation results, 
the probability that an individual in the sample purchased lotto tickets declined with age and 
increases with years of formal education, exactly opposite the results from the Tobit model.  The 
estimated parameters from the spending equation in the double hurdle model, in columns two 
and three on Table 2, indicate that spending on lotto tickets increases with age and decreases 
with formal education, like those from the Tobit model.   
  In this case, the Tobit model produces parameter estimates that reflect the overall effect 
of the separate participation and spending decisions included in the double hurdle model.  In the 
case of age, the Tobit results indicate that as people age, they spend more on lotto tickets, other 
things equal.  However, the double hurdle results indicate that participation actually falls as 
individuals age, but that those who do participate in lotto spend more on tickets as they get older.  
The double hurdle results indicate an even stronger spending by older participants.  In the case of 
education, the Tobit model results indicate that spending on lotto tickets declines among more 
educated individuals; the double hurdle results indicate that participation in lotto rises, but   7
spending falls with formal education.  In both cases, the spending effect outweighs the 
participation effect, which is reflected in the parameter estimates from the Tobit model.  Note 
that if the participation effect was stronger relative to the spending effect, the Tobit model could 
potentially generate parameter estimates that were not statistically significant, completely 
masking these two effects. 
  Note that differences between the Tobit and double hurdle results also exist for the 
income variable.  The Tobit results indicate that spending on lotto increases with income; the 
double hurdle results indicate that spending increases, but participation does not increase.  Low 
income individuals are no more likely to participate in lotto than high income individuals, but 
conditional on participation, high income individuals spend more on lotto tickets.  This has 
important implications for understanding participation in lotto, since lotto can be viewed as an 
effective tax on participants, given that only 65% of lotto revenues are paid out as prizes, and the 
participation results indicate that the burden of this tax does not fall disproportionately on lower 
income individuals.  This result has also important implications for governments looking to 
either add lotto to the gambling or to introduce other types of lotto games in their jurisdiction but 
are hesitant on the fear of adding an additional strain to low income residents of their 
jurisdiction. 
  Recall from the discussion above that the Tobit model is nested in the double hurdle 
model.  This nesting provides a formal test of how each model fits the sample data using a 
standard likelihood ratio test.  If LT is the maximum value of the log-likelihood function for the 
Tobit model and LDH the maximum value of the log-likelihood function for the double hurdle 
model, then the likelihood ratio LR = -2 (LDH - LT) is distributed as a χ
2 random variable with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameter restrictions that must be placed on the 
double hurdle model to produce the Tobit model.  The null hypothesis for this test is that the 
restrictions placed on the double hurdle model that generate the Tobit model are appropriate 
given the sample data; the alternative hypothesis is that the restrictions placed on the double 
hurdle model are not appropriate.  In this case, the parameters of the participation equation must 
be equal to zero for the double hurdle model to be equivalent to the Tobit model, generating six 
restrictions.  The likelihood ratio statistic is 26.44, which has a p-value smaller than 0.001.  The 
restricted model, in this case Tobit, does not fit the data as well as the unrestricted double hurdle 
model. 
  We performed several robustness checks on the results reported on Table 2.  First, 
although the double hurdle literature makes no specific reference to the need for exclusion 
restrictions, in practice many double hurdle applications include them.  In this setting, an 
exclusion restriction means excluding one or more variables from the spending equation in the 
double hurdle model that appears in the participation equation.  Exclusion restrictions are used in 
instrumental variables estimation to identify the endogenous variable in the second stage.  In this 
setting, and exclusion restriction would identify the participation effect, although the double 
hurdle model is not an instrumental variable estimator.  In terms of the statistical models 
developed above, an exclusion restriction means that a variable appears in the vector of 
explanatory variables for the participation equation Zi that does not appear in the vector of 
explanatory variables for the spending equation Xi.  We added an indicator variable identifying 
individuals who agreed or strongly agreed with the idea that use of a “system” would lead to 
larger gambling winnings. This belief could affect individual’s decision to participate in 
gambling.  Adding this variable to the participation equation did not affect any of the other 
results reported on Table 2, and did not affect the likelihood ratio test.  The parameter estimate   8
on this variable was not statistically significant in the double hurdle model.  Second, the 
estimates on Table 2 are for the case where the two error terms in the double hurdle model, νi and 
εi, are assumed to be independent. We also estimated a double hurdle model assuming that these 
two error terms were not independent, and instead were correlated.  The results from this double 
hurdle model with dependent errors was nearly identical to those from the independent model 
results on Table 2. 
 
Conclusions 
Any sample of individuals asked about gambling will contain a significant number who report 
never gambling.  These non-participants generate zeros in the survey data.  In this paper, we 
discuss how these non-participants arrive at this decision, and show how this decision has 
important statistical ramifications.  In the case of gambling, where most of the observed non-
participants reflect either abstentions or corner solutions, this decision process implies that the 
Heckman selectivity model does not apply, because this model explicitly rules out corner 
solutions, while methods that permit corner solutions like the Tobit model or the double hurdle 
model can be used.  We also show that, in the case of data from a survey of gamblers in Alberta, 
the double hurdle model fits the data better than the Tobit model. 
  Our results have several important implications for gambling research.  Although much 
gambling research focuses on distinguishing problem gamblers from other gamblers, we point 
out that much can be learned from the other margin, by analyzing differences between gamblers 
and non-gamblers.  The decision not to gamble can be systematically categorized into non-
participation due to lack of access to gabling opportunities, abstentions, and corner solutions 
representing individuals who would gamble if effective prices were lower or their income was 
higher.  Our results indicate that many of the non-participants in this sample may be abstentions, 
since this would be consistent with the double hurdle model fitting the data better than the Tobit 
model.  If abstentions are important, then participation in gambling will be relatively insensitive 
to changes in the effective price of gambling.  This has important policy implications, especially 
where policy makers are concerned with the spread of gambling in a population.  In addition, 
since our results show that gamblers and non-gamblers differ systematically, results from studies 
that focus only on the behaviour of gamblers may not generalize to the entire population.  These 
systematic differences imply that non-gamblers may respond differently to policy interventions 
than gamblers. 
  Second, from a methodological perspective, our results indicate that the heavy reliance on 
the Tobit model to analyze consumer spending on gambling may be misplaced.  The Tobit model 
restricts the participation decision to be identical to the spending decision.  Our results indicate 
that, for important explanatory variables like age, income, and education, this assumption may 
not fit the data well.  Future research on gambling participation and expenditure should 
recognize this limitation to the Tobit model, and use alternative methods like the double hurdle 
model that make less restrictive assumptions about the decision to participate in gambling. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
        
Variable Mean S.D.  Min  Max
Participated in Lotto in last year  0.57 0.50  0  1
Average monthly spending on Lotto   8.28 19.51  0  350
Age 43.31 15.51  18  90
Income (000s)  49.28 29.64  0  120
Education (years)  14.36 2.87  3  23
Male 0.50 0.50  0  1
Married 0.63 0.48  0  1
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Table 2: Double Hurdle and Tobit Estimates 






Variable Parameter t-Stat. Parameter t-Stat. Parameter t-Stat. 
Age 0.294 5.28 -0.078 -3.61  0.180 3.65
Income (000s)  0.052 1.73 0.009 0.75  0.067 2.24
Education (years)  -1.589 -5.47 0.204 2.72  -1.242 -4.44
Male 6.254 4.15 1.062 2.15  7.169 4.82
Married 2.545 1.43 -0.261 -0.58  3.197 1.84
Log Likelihood  -5299       -5312  
N  1788          1788   
 
 
                                                 
1 This discussion draws on the application of Tobit and double hurdle models to cigarette smoking by Garcia and 
Labeaga (1996). Department of Economics, University of Alberta 
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